

Regulatory & Tariff reforms	
IPPs policy 1991	
<ul> <li>Utilities don't have money to pay IPPs</li> </ul>	
1995-1998: Utilities financial condition has to be improv	ved
<ul> <li>depoliticalise through independent regulator</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Transparency &amp; accountability</li> </ul>	
- Reduction in T&D losses	
<ul> <li>Bring Operational efficiency</li> </ul>	
– Tariff reforms	
<ul> <li>Tariff provides only 70% of the cost of supply</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Non-transparent, political tariff</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Misuse of Energy as well as non-transparent subsidy</li> </ul>	
Electricity Regulatory Commission Act 1998	-
• Electricity Act 2003 and National Tariff Policy	

Options	Description
Performance based regulation (PBR)	Characterised by RPI-X+Y formula Base cost set at beginning of control period (3-7 yrs ordinarily based on historical cost data Efficiency gains/losses to account of utility Pass through of external costs (Y) allowed
Reference Utility regulation (RUR)	Based on forward looking (incremental) cost framework Hypothetical "ideal" utility modelled based on load and generation configuration for control period (upto 10 years) Tariffs for "ideal" utility set in advance and subject to only a few pass through elements (primarily fuel)
Target based regulation (TBR)	Specific targets set for important operating elements (e.g. losses, collections, quality of service) for control period All other cost elements subject to normal cost -plus regulation Improvements on targets to account of utility or shared with consumers and vice -versa





## Sales- Metered

### **Approaches**

- CAGR of sales for the last 3, 5 years or more
- Forecast based on methods such as use of Average annual load factor
- Econometric modeling

### Prudent adjustment for

- a) Abnormal addition of consumers in any given area (on the basis of proposed city plan, tax holidays, Government incentives for industrial establishments, e tc.)
- b) Inflection point in economic cycle (boom, slowdown, recession or expansion)
- c) Variations in weather conditions
- d) Materially significant findings during audit check.

### **Issues**

•Availability of audited numbers on slab-wise sales figure

Regular check of meters



# Sales - Unmetered

### **Background**

- Billing of un-metered consumers on flat rate on INR/HP/Month
- T&D loss camouflage
- While some SERCs accept norms specified by licensees, select SERCs conduct studies to determine the consumption norm. Licensees and SERCs remain almost always in disagreement with the norm calculated by each other.

### Possible Forecasting Methodology

- An Independent study with Distribution licensee to be conducted to assess actual consumption.
- Distribution licensee to conduct year long month-wise study to establish base line norms.
- Results to be submitted to the Regulator.
- The study shall cover actual consumption in the zones (hours of usage, specifications of motor (power etc.)) demonstrating seasonal impact, economic development, demographics, consumption pattern, etc. Stratified sampling shall be used for the study.

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Distribution and AT&C Losses (Cont)	-
Billing of metered and un-metered sales to be done as discussed before	
<ul> <li>Distribution licensee to ensure that input and output points of licensee's operations are metered/normalized as efficiently as possible to aid in Energy accounting and audit required for the purpose of estimation of baseline AT&amp;C losses</li> </ul>	
Proposed Annual loss reduction (by RAPDRP) against the existing loss levels	
Below 15% Below 1%	
15%-20% 1% to 2%	
20%-30% 2% to 3%	
<ul> <li>OTHER Options- Where Distribution Licensee is unable to reduce losses -</li> <li>Circle-wise Distribution loss reduction targets shall be approved.</li> <li>Circle-wise differential tariff shall also be implemented to mobilize support/push from the consumer on the Distribution Licensee to drive loss reduction.</li> <li>Distribution Franchisee</li> </ul>	
10.	



### **Background**

- Inappropriate Sales Forecast Inappropriate power procurement plan High short term power purchase cost Financial losses to Distribution licensee.
- Significant difference in actual and approved Power purchase qua ntum/cost
- Lack of true-up practice or delay in true-up exercise and ultimately disallowance of short term power purchase during true up, if any, further augments losses of the Distribution Licensee to a considerable extent.

Possible Methodology for base level approval for Power Purchase quantum/Cost

- Comprehensive Power Procurement Plan- To be a component of MYT petition
  - Procurement plan for medium & long term shall be addressed by competitive bidding (separately for peak and base requirement)
  - States with generation mix having less coal or hydro resource: J V with coal bearing states.
  - Procurement from renewable energy sources as stipulated by SERC

















# **Cross- Subsidy/Tariff Design**

- Cross subsidy support- BPL consumer consuming power below 30 units per month.
- Tariff for such consumer to be 50% of the average cost of supply.
- SERC would notify revised roadmap within six months from the notification of these Regulations with a target that latest by the end of year 2015-16 tariffs are within ± 20 % of the average cost of supply.
- The road map would also have intermediate milestones, based on the approach of a gradual reduction in cross subsidy.



# Treatment of Regulatory Assets Regulatory asset to be an exception and not norm: Regulatory assets shall be created only if the licensee incur losses on account of factorsbeyond its control. Regulatory Asset: Not to be created to cover the losses incurred in normal course of business. Financial arrangement or capital restructuring shall be deployed to cover the gap. Amortization schedule corresponding to the regulatory asset shall be prepared and put in effect along with creation of the regulatory asset. Carrying cost of the regulatory asset shall be line with the State Bank Advanœ Rate (SBAR) for the tenure for which regulatory asset has been created









